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Abstract 
A large body of literature has investigated the factors that lead to abstention on the one hand or 
vote volatility on the other hand. We argue in this paper that the most fruitful approach is to 
simultaneously consider the exit, voice, and loyalty options. The analyses are based on data from 
the CSES and cover a broad set of advanced democracies. We demonstrate that while party 
switchers and abstainers have a lot in common, switching parties can be considered a more 
positive choice. Most importantly, contrary to what previous research suggested and in contrast to 
abstainers, party switchers cannot be characterized as frustrated with politics. Furthermore, the 
supply side does to a certain extent affect whether voters choose to remain loyal, switch parties, 
or abstain from voting. 
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1.  Introduction 
In his classic book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschmann (1970) has powerfully argued that 
having loyal supporters is fundamental for political parties. And mass parties (Duverger, 1954) 
seemed to accomplish this goal. The ‘60s and ‘70s of the previous century can be considered 
dominated by loyalty to political parties (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) 
From the late seventies onwards, however, a gradual erosion of stability in voting 
behavior has been pointed out (Pedersen, 1979). Furthermore, turnout levels have been shown to 
be decreasing over the past few decades (Franklin, 2004; Gray & Caul, 2000). With loyalty 
towards a particular party decreasing, it seems that voters are making use of voice (party 
switching) and exit (abstaining) options more often. 
The Hirschmann framework leads us to expect that it is dissatisfaction that is causing 
voters to refrain from loyally voting for their party in subsequent elections. We know, however, 
that it is crucial to distinguish between political dissatisfaction towards one particular party and a 
more generalized sense of political dissatisfaction (Bélanger, 2004; Miller & Listhaug, 1990). In 
a first step, therefore, we investigate how different types of political dissatisfaction are related to 
exit, voice and loyalty options in voting behaviour. 
A number of scholars have already implemented Hirschmann’s theory in the field of 
voting behaviour (Bélanger, 2004; Hooghe, Marien & Pauwels, 2010; Kang, 2004; Kselman & 
Niou, 2010; Weber, 2011). These studies, however, either focus on one or a limited number of 
countries, or do not aim to investigate how the context affects whether voters choose exit, voice 
or loyalty. In a second step, we therefore assess how the number of options (i.e., parties) voters 
have affects the extent to which they choose an exit or voice option.  
This paper addresses the question of how dissatisfaction translates either in party 
switching or abstention and how contextual differences affect the choice between the two 
options. We study volatility and abstention at an individual level in a broad sample of advanced 
industrialized countries. We do so by making use of data from the second and third modules of 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). We investigate dynamics in voting 
behaviour among 34,568 individuals in 36 elections and 22 countries.i We start with an overview 
of the literature on volatility and turnout and elaborate on our expectations. The next section 
describes the data and methods, after which we present the results. We end with concluding 
remarks on the implications of our findings and caveats of the current analyses. 
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2. Voice or Exit? 
A number of scholars have pointed out that we are witnessing a ‘political malaise’ in advanced 
industrial democracies, with levels of satisfaction and trust in politics decreasing (Bélanger, 
2004; Hetherington, 1998; Norris, 1999). While a fairly general trend, the work of Hirschmann 
(1970) leads us to expect that this ‘malaise’ is linked to different behavioural consequences. 
Indeed, Hirschmann has argued that people have different ways of dealing with dissatisfaction. 
Customers dissatisfied with a particular product or brand, for example, can continue buying that 
product (loyalty), voice their dissatisfaction by complaining to the producer (voice), or decide not 
to buy that product anymore and choose another product instead (exit).  
 Hirschmann’s theoretical framework has previously been applied in the field of political 
science (Bélanger, 2004; Kang, 2004; Kweit, 1986; Weber, 2011). Most of these authors have 
focused on how dissatisfaction can lead voters to leave the party they earlier voted for or were a 
member of, which has been framed as Hirschmann’s exit option. Not focusing on particular 
parties but on the party system more generally, we have a slightly different take on how exit, 
voice and loyalty are options for voters. We argue that when a voter is politically dissatisfied, as a 
first option this voter can decide to remain loyal to her previous party and vote for this party in 
subsequent elections. A second option is to voice dissatisfaction by deserting the earlier preferred 
party and voting for another party instead. This signaling of dissatisfaction by changing parties is 
much alike the pattern of third party voting referred to by Bélanger (2004). While switching 
implies that a certain party is deserted, this voter still turns out to vote and hence does not leave 
the party system. For this reason, we refer to this second possibility as the voice-option. Finally, a 
dissatisfied voter can think none of the other parties are worthy of her vote and decide to abstain. 
We label this third option as the exit-option, as the voter leaves the party system (Hooghe, 
Marien, Pauwels, 2011).  
 Scholars initially disagreed on the presence of increasing volatility (Mair, 1993). As 
empirical evidence on the growth of volatility has accumulated, however, this has by now been 
considered an established fact (Dalton et al., 2000; Mair, 2008). For declining turnout levels as 
well, the empirical evidence is convincing and accumulating (Blais, 2010; Franklin, 2004; Gray 
& Caul, 2000).  
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Both increasing volatility and decreasing turnout are caused by the wider process of 
dealignment. Additionally, party switching and abstention are closely linked in the sense that 
each of them contributes to electoral instability. Therefore, we side with Zelle, who stated: ‘… 
even though nonvoting is a vital aspect of electoral change just as party switching is, (…) it is 
equally as vital to investigate each of these aspects in its own right’ (Zelle, 1995: 320).  
 
3.  Explaining Switching and Abstaining 
3.1. Individual-level Determinants: Political Satisfaction 
Whether or not citizens turn out to vote has repeatedly been shown to be affected by their 
political attitudes. Voters have been argued to be more dutiful compared to nonvoters (Blais, 
2000; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968) and they have been found to have higher levels of political 
efficacy (Karp & Banducci, 2008), political trust and satisfaction with democracy (Grönlund & 
Setälä, 2007; Hetherington, 1999). Interestingly, vote switching as well has been linked to 
scoring low on these fundamental political attitudes. Zelle (1995) formulated the hypothesis of 
party switching as such being caused by ‘frustration’. The mechanism suggested to cause vote 
switching by Zelle is one in which a voter is first disappointed with her party. This frustration 
with a particular party is then thought to trigger a sense of disaffection with the entire political 
system and all parties. As a way to voice this frustration, a floating voter switches parties. 
Investigating his floating voter hypothesis, Zelle (1995) finds that floating voters in 
Germany have a lower level of trust in parties compared to stable voters. Additionally, they like 
their preferred party less than stable voters do and they are less satisfied with the political system. 
As such, Zelle (1995) provides evidence that floating voters have political attitudes very much 
alike those of nonvoters and others have confirmed this image (Dalton & Weldon, 2005; 
Dassonneville, 2012; Söderlund, 2008).  
The ‘frustrated floating voter’ hypothesis implies that, like citizens abstaining from 
voting, volatile voters are politically dissatisfied. Political satisfaction is a broad concept, 
however, and encompasses both specific and more general attitudes towards the regime or the 
political system at large. Like political support, therefore, political satisfaction can be thought of 
as a continuum ranging from diffuse to specific (Linde & Ekman, 2003; Norris, 1999). These 
dimensions of satisfaction are reflected in the work of Söderlund (2008), who investigates the 
impact of satisfaction with a particular party on volatility and abstention while explicitly 
5 
 
controlling for more general attitudes of satisfaction with democracy or efficacy. As Söderlund 
(2008: 222) states: ‘those people who are critical of certain parties at certain brief periods of 
time need not be critical of the political system as a whole, and vice versa’. While in essence 
different, it is clear though that dissatisfaction with a particular party can ‘spill over to influence 
judgments of the regime as a whole’ (Miller & Listhaug, 1990: 357).  
Zelle (1995) stressed the similarities between nonvoters and voters switching parties and 
argued that switching parties is triggered by a general feeling of political dissatisfaction. Only 
focusing on volatile voters and standpatters, however, he could not assess the difference in levels 
of satisfaction between volatile voters and abstainers. Furthermore, Zelle (1995) did not 
distinguish between specific and diffuse feelings of political satisfaction. The fact that scholars 
describe different degrees of dissatisfaction, from diffuse to specific, leads us to expect these 
differences to be reflected in voters’ electoral behaviour as well. Voters switching parties should 
not necessarily be dissatisfied with the political system as such, while voters abstaining are more 
likely to be so.  
Regarding satisfaction with a specific party, Söderlund (2008) demonstrated that in the 
Nordic countries both voters switching parties and voters abstaining are dissatisfied with the 
performance of the party they previously voted for. By switching parties the dissatisfied can send 
a strong signal to their previously preferred party, by not only punishing that party but also 
strengthening its competitors (Kselman and Niou, 2010). Clearly, there are theoretical as well as 
empirical reasons for expecting dissatisfaction with one’s previous party to increase the 
probability not only of abstaining but of switching as well. Additionally, in an analysis of third 
party voting, Bélanger (2004) has shown that the effect of dissatisfaction with a specific party on 
switching to a third party is stronger than the effect on abstention. Not limiting the analyses to 
third parties only, but focusing on switching parties in general and for a broader set of countries, 
we expect to find dissatisfaction with a specific party to explain both party switching and 
abstention. The effect on party switching is furthermore expected to be stronger than the effect on 
abstaining from voting. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Dissatisfaction with the party previously voted for increases the probability 
of abstaining and of the probability of party switching even more. 
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A sense of dissatisfaction with a particular party can eventually develop into 
dissatisfaction with all parties and the political system at large (Gidengil et al., 2001; Miller & 
Listhaug, 1990) and it is this more general sense of political dissatisfaction that should lead 
voters to abstain from voting. In line with the frustrated floating voter hypothesis, furthermore, 
voters switching parties are also expected to have a lower level of general political satisfaction 
compared to stable voters. In line with what Bélanger (2004) has shown for voting for third 
parties on the one hand and abstention on the other, we expect this difference to be more 
pronounced when contrasting abstainers with stable voters. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Political dissatisfaction increases the probability of switching parties and 
increases the probability of abstaining even more. 
 
3.2. The Party System: Number of Parties 
Individual-level characteristics can be considered crucial determinants of stability, switching and 
abstaining. If we want to fully understand why voters choose one particular option, however, we 
have to acknowledge the fact that vote choices are not made in a void (Anderson & Dalton, 
2010). For this reason, we have to take into account characteristics of the party system as well. 
We focus on the number of parties in a system, as a way to take the supply side into account. 
The number of parties should self-evidently affect the probability that a voter switches 
parties from one election to another. The logic is straightforward; more parties increase the 
probability of switching because there are simply more options to choose from. Furthermore, 
with more parties available, the likelihood increases that a voter finds an alternative to her 
previous choice that is worthy of her vote (Blais & Gschwend, 2010). So far, this link between 
the number of options available and vote switching has been investigated at an aggregate level. 
Most of the available aggregate-level evidence does suggest that the number of parties in a 
system significantly increases net volatility (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; 
Lane & Ersson, 2007). Obviously, there could also be reciprocal effects of unstable electorates 
leading to party fragmentation. Tavits (2008), however, has convincingly shown that in young 
democracies volatility follows from changes in the party system, not vice versa. At an individual-
level as well, we expect that more parties increase the probability of vote switching from one 
election to another. 
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Hypothesis 3: A higher number of parties increases the probability of switching parties. 
 
The link between the number of parties and turnout has received wide scholarly attention. 
Nevertheless, conflicting findings have led to different expectations on how the number of parties 
affects individual voters’ likelihood of turning out to vote. On the one hand, it is claimed that 
with more options available, the probability that a voter finds a party upon her liking increases. 
Additionally, more parties also imply that more actors are trying to get citizens out to vote. 
Consequently, more parties are expected to lead to higher levels of turnout (Banducci & Karp, 
2009; Blais & Aarts, 2006). The opposite finding, more parties being associated with lower levels 
of turnout at an aggregate level, has been found and interpreted as well. With more parties 
running for election, the link between the outcome of the election and the formation of the 
(coalition) government is less direct. Consequently, voters perceive their vote as less decisive and 
are less likely to turn out (Jackman, 1987). Furthermore, the fact that with an increasing number 
of parties the complexity of the system increases might cause voters to abstain. This as well, 
could be a reason for lower turnout as the number of parties is higher (Blais & Dobrzynska, 
1998). In an effort to integrate both theories, Taagepera, Selb and Grofman (2014) have recently 
suggested a logical model and show that we should expect a curvilinear relation. Their findings 
indicate that turnout increases first but decreases afterwards as the number of parties increases. In 
further efforts to disentangle what individual causal mechanisms are at play, scholars have only 
recently started to investigate the effect of the party system on turnout by means of comparative 
individual-level data. These efforts have indicated that there is evidence for both processes, and 
depending on what factors are controlled for the estimated effect of the number of parties on 
individual-level turnout can change direction (Banducci & Karp, 2009; Brockington, 2004; 
Kittilson & Anderson, 2010). We hypothesize that the presence of more parties decreases the 
likelihood that voters will abstain from voting. 
 
Hypothesis 4: A higher number of parties decreases the probability of abstaining. 
 
3.3. Combining Individual-level and Party System Determinants 
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Empirical research on the effect of institutional factors on volatility and turnout is mostly at an 
aggregate level. Research on the individual-level determinants of both party switching and 
abstention on the other hand, mostly makes use of survey data within one or a few countries. As 
there are important factors at both the individual and the contextual level, ‘an ideal analysis 
would consider both types of factors simultaneously’ (Powell, 1986: 23). The CSES dataset not 
only allow us to integrate individual and contextual-level determinants, but also to investigate 
how contextual factors mitigate individual-level effects.  
Previous research on how exit, voice and loyalty are options to express dissatisfaction 
have focused on one or a limited number of countries (Bélanger, 2004; Bélanger and Nadeau, 
2005; Kang, 2004; Hooghe, Marien and Pauwels, 2010) or do not aim to explain country-level 
differences with respect to the individual-level mechanisms (Weber, 2011). In the current paper, 
we build on this individual-level research and investigate how the context can mitigate the effect 
of dissatisfaction.  
We can expect the number of alternatives voters have to affect what option voters choose 
to voice their dissatisfaction. Not only do we expect dissatisfaction to lead to switching, we 
furthermore assume that having a higher number of alternatives on Election Day strengthens the 
link between dissatisfaction with one’s party and the propensity to switch parties. The underlying 
logic is that when a voter has few alternatives to choose between, she has less viable or 
ideologically close options to switch to. Consequently, with fewer options the dissatisfied might 
be more inclined to remain loyal to their previous party. Consequently, with more parties at offer 
a voter should be swayed more easily to voice dissatisfaction with her party by switching to 
another party – either a major or traditional party or a protest party. If so, dissatisfaction might 
translate less easily into abstention when the number of parties is higher. 
 
Hypothesis 5: As the number of parties increases, the relation between dissatisfaction with 
the party previously voted for and the probability of switching gets stronger 
 
4. Data and Method 
4.1. Data 
We make use of data from the second and third modules of the CSES-project. The project 
provides data from surveys that use identical question wording and coding of items and that were 
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all in the field shortly after national elections. As a result, the CSES project enhances the validity 
of cross-national research on voting behaviour (Nevitte et al., 2009).  
We focus on voters’ likelihood of choosing the exit, voice or loyalty options vis-à-vis the 
party they supported in the previous election. Therefore, we constructed a dependent variable that 
has three possible outcomes: (1) loyally voting for the same party in two consecutive elections, 
(2) switching parties, (3) switching from voting in the first election to abstaining in the second. 
Since the CSES-data are cross-sectional, we use the recall question about previous voting 
behaviour as the reference point for the analysis. Only those respondents who indicated that they 
voted in the previous election and who revealed their vote choice are included in the analysis. 
Quite logically, our interest in the impact of satisfaction with the party previously voted for on 
party switching and abstaining implies a focus on those respondents who did vote in the previous 
election. 
A question on recalled voting behaviour in the previous election was included from the 
second CSES-module onwards. Because the question is not asked in all the CSES-surveys, our 
dataset is restrained to those countries for which surveys did include a recall question. 
Additionally, we focus on voting in parliamentary elections, excluding presidential elections. An 
extra condition for elections to be included in the dataset was that they were conducted freely 
according to the standards of Freedom House.ii Recall questions on previous voting behaviour are 
imperfect measures, most importantly because they lead to a bias towards consistency (Converse, 
1962; Festinger, 1957). Memory problems further add to an overestimation of stable vote choices 
and civic duty additionally leads respondents who abstained to report that they did go out to vote 
(Waldahl & Aardal, 2000). Acknowledging that recall questions come with measurement bias, 
we cross-validated the data by comparing respondents’ recalled voting behaviour with actual 
election results. Only the election samples for which the recalled vote closely matched election 
results were retained.iii This step reduces the sample of countries included to mostly established 
democracies, limiting the generalizability of our results. We prefer, however, to be cautious in 
our use of recalled voting behaviour for assessing the causes of electoral volatility.  
Changes in the party system between two consecutive elections complicate the task of 
defining what changes in vote choices are to be defined as party switches. Voters who indicated 
having voted for a party that split from the party they previously voted for are treated as stable. 
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Likewise, voters who previously voted for one of the parties of a merger of parties and voted for 
this merged party are treated as stable voters.iv  
Missing data on some of the independent variables further reduced the dataset to 34,568 
individuals in 36 elections in 22 countries. The elections included in the analysis are listed in 
Appendix 1, with the distribution of loyalists, switchers, and exiters. As expected, abstainers are 
underrepresented in the surveys (about 5% of the sample). Abstainers are somewhat more 
numerous and add up to over 10% of the sample in the Norwegian 2002, the British 2005 and the 
Irish 2007 election and to over 30% of the sample in the Polish 2005 election. Switchers typically 
constitute about a quarter of the sample but form an absolute majority in the Irish 2007 election. 
Furthermore, switchers are particularly numerous in the Dutch 2002 and 2010 elections. As for 
loyalists, they are usually about two-thirds of the cases, with the maximum being observed in the 
2009 election in Uruguay. 
 
4.2. Measures 
As a measure of respondents’ general level of political satisfaction we include an item on 
satisfaction with the democratic process. The question wording is ‘On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in 
[country]?’ This 1 to 4 item of satisfaction with democracy (reverse coding) is included in the 
analyses and was standardized to run from 0 to 1. The use of this item has previously been 
criticized (Canache, Mondak & Selegson, 2001; Linde & Ekman, 2003). The lack of an 
alternative measure of political support such as political trust in the CSES-dataset leads us to rely 
on the satisfaction with democracy item, which Anderson (2001: 10) has called “a reasonable 
(albeit imperfect) indicator that we can use to test our theories”. 
In order to investigate voters’ level of satisfaction with the party they previously voted 
for, we use a measure of affect. Doing so, we remain close to Zelle’s original conception of 
satisfaction. The measure is the like-dislike rating (on a scale from 0 to 10) of the party the 
respondent indicates having voted for in the previous election. For reasons of comparability, the 
item on satisfaction with one’s party was standardized to run from 0 to 1. 
As partisans are less likely to switch parties or to abstain from voting, we control for the 
effect of party identification. Therefore, we make use of the CSES-question asking whether they 
feel close to a particular party (yes=1 or no=0). Controlling for partisanship should help to 
11 
 
neutralize the impact of long-term predispositions on the short-term party evaluations we are 
interested in. 
Converse already pointed out in 1962 that “The same theory which predicts that the less 
involved are more susceptible to party change suggest that the less involved will also give less 
accurate accounts of past political behavior”  (Converse, 1962: 580). Given that there is no other 
option for investigating party switching than to rely on information from recall questions, it could 
be claimed that we should control for the effect of factors such as levels of education or political 
knowledge. Therefore we also verified whether our conclusions hold when controlling for voters’ 
level of education (whether or not they have a college degree), political knowledge (based on the 
three knowledge questions included in the CSES modules), and age and gender.  
At a contextual level, we are interested in how the number of parties affects the 
probability of stability, switching and abstaining respectively. Therefore, we rely on the index of 
the effective number of parties suggested by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). By using this 
measure instead of the mere number of parties on the ballot, we capture the number of viable 
alternatives voters have on Election Day. The data come from Gallagher (2014). Additionally, we 
control for whether or not voting was compulsory, as this obviously strongly affects the 
probability that a voter abstains from voting (Powell, 1986). Therefore, we include a dummy 
variable for whether or not voting was compulsory, with strict sanctions; see IDEA (Lopez Pintor 
& Gratschew, 2002). Given our focus on the number of parties in a system, we present a 
parsimonious model with these contextual variables only. In order to ascertain that it is the 
number of parties and therefore the size of the choice set that matters, we verify whether the 
results hold when controlling for other contextual-level variables. Because the number of parties 
is clearly related to the electoral system (Neto & Cox, 1997), we control for disproportionality 
(using the least squares indicator). Furthermore, recent studies have stressed the importance of 
polarization rather than formal electoral rules as a factor affecting citizens’ political attitudes and 
behaviour (Dalton, 2008; Kittilson & Anderson, 2010; Thomassen, 2014). Therefore, we assess 
whether our results with regard to the number of parties hold when controlling for the level of 
polarization in a party system.  
 
4.3. Method 
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The data have a hierarchical structure, with respondents nested in elections and these elections 
nested in countries. Additionally, the aggregate-level descriptive statistics of our dependent 
variable presented in Appendix 1 indicate that there is a substantial amount of variation at the 
level of elections to be taken into account. Furthermore, given that we are interested in 
explanatory factors at the individual as well as the contextual level, we make use of multilevel 
modeling (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). We specify random intercepts across the election-
samples and for testing the interactive effect of contextual and individual-level variables, we 
additionally specify a random slope for the like-dislike variable. 
 The categorical nature of our dependent variable, with three possible outcomes, 
necessitates the use of multinomial regression models. Therefore, we present the results of a 
series of multinomial multilevel regression models. The models are run via the runmlwin 
command in Stata (Lecki & Charlton, 2013), which allows for estimating complex multilevel 
models. Starting values for estimations are obtained through a second order penalized quasi-
likelihood (PQL2) estimation, after which final models are fitted using Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) methods. We do so because quasi-likelihood methods for multilevel modeling 
with discrete responses have been shown to give biased results (Lecki & Charlton, 2013). The fit 
of models estimated by MCMC approximation can be assessed by looking at the Bayesian 
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC), with a lower value indicating a better model-fit 
(Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). 
 
5.  Results 
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 1. As a first step, we estimated an intercept-
only model, which gives insights on the total amount of variance at the level of elections. While 
the estimates of this intercept-only model are not shown, it is important to note that there is more 
contextual-level variation in the extent to which voters abstain from voting (σ2=1.822) than there 
is for party switching (σ2=0.386).  
Performing a multinomial logistic regression on a dependent variable with three outcome 
categories gives us two sets of estimates, each of them assessing the impact of the variables for 
an outcome relative to the base category (which is voting loyally for the same party in two 
consecutive elections). Additionally, we present the effect of the independent variables on the 
probability of abstaining contrasted with switching parties. This set of parameters is nothing more 
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than a linear transformation of the original parameters (Gidengil et al., 2001; Whitten & Palmer, 
1996). 
We first look at the effect of the extent to which respondents like the party they 
previously voted for. In line with our first hypothesis, we expect higher levels of satisfaction to 
decrease the probability of abstaining and to decrease the probability of switching even more 
strongly. As clear from the results in Table 1, the more a voter likes the party she previously 
voted for, the smaller her probability of both switching and of abstaining. Furthermore, the extent 
to which a voter likes her previous party decreases the probability of switching more strongly 
than the probability of abstaining, as we hypothesized. The more a voter likes her previous party, 
the more likely she is to abstain rather than to switch to another party. Because log-odds 
coefficients of a multinomial regression model are hard to interpret, in Figure 1 we graphically 
present the estimated effect of the extent to which a voter likes her previous party on the 
probability of being loyal, switching parties and abstaining respectively. Figure 1 clarifies that 
satisfaction with one’s previous party mostly affects two behavioural options; the more one likes 
the party previously voted for, the higher the probability of being loyal to that party and the 
smaller the probability that a voter switches parties. At the same time, whether or not voters 
abstain from voting is hardly affected by the extent to which they like the party they previously 
voted for. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Our second hypothesis is that a general sense of political satisfaction reduces the 
probability that a voter abstains from voting. Additionally, it was stated that higher levels of 
political satisfaction would reduce the likelihood of party switching, but to a lesser extent than for 
abstention. As can be read from the results in Table 1, this is not what our results point at. A 
higher level of satisfaction with democracy does significantly decrease the probability of 
abstaining compared to remaining loyal to the party previously voted for, but it does not 
significantly affect the probability of switching parties.  
 The fact that we standardized the main independent variables to both run from 0 to 1 
allows us to directly compare their effect on switching and abstaining. Coefficients are bigger for 
satisfaction with one’s previous party, indicating that for understanding both why voters switch 
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parties and why they decide to abstain, it is more important to look at how voters think about 
their party than to look at more general feelings of political dissatisfaction. 
(A lack of) satisfaction is linked to the extent to which voters switch parties or abstain 
from voting, but we know that vote choices are not made in a void. Reflecting on the way in 
which the context matters, we hypothesized that a higher number of parties would increase the 
probability of switching parties (H3), but decrease the probability of abstaining (H4). Our results 
do indicate that a higher number of parties significantly increases the probability that a voter 
switches compared to the probability that she remains loyal to her party. In contrast to our fourth 
hypothesis, however, the probability of abstaining compared to remaining loyal is not 
significantly affected by the number of parties. Clearly, the number of viable options available to 
voters affects whether they will switch parties or remain loyal. The probability of abstaining, by 
contrast, is not significantly smaller when voters have more options to choose between. While not 
confirming our fourth hypothesis, this non-finding can hardly be considered surprising; previous 
studies do not agree on the effect of the number of parties on turnout. Finally, compulsory voting 
evidently reduces the probability that a voter abstains.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Besides hypothesizing about a main effect of the number of parties at offer, we also 
hypothesized a higher number of parties to strengthen the relation between voters’ assessment of 
their previous party and their probabilities of switching (H5). In Table 2, we verify this by 
including a cross-level interaction between the effective number of parties and voters’ like-dislike 
rating of their previous party. Self-evidently, random slope variances for the like-dislike variable 
are specified in this model, both for the contrast between switching and loyalty (σ2like dislike election 
switching) and for the contrast between abstention and loyalty (σ2like dislike election abstaining). The data 
confirm the fifth hypothesis. The more a voter likes her previous party, the lower the probability 
of switching. As the number of parties increases, this negative effect is strengthened (as clear 
from the negative and significant interaction term). Additionally, and surprisingly, the negative 
effect of satisfaction on abstaining is strengthened as the number of parties in a system increases. 
 
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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The presence of more parties renders party switching a more viable option. Substantively, 
as the number of parties – and therefore the options available – increases, dissatisfaction with 
one’s party translates more easily into party switching. We graphically present this interaction 
effect in Figure 2. The graph illustrates the negative relation between the extent to which one 
likes one’s previous party and the probability to switch parties for party systems of varying size. 
In both small and large party systems, liking one’s previous party decreases the probability that a 
voter switches parties. In large party systems, however, the impact is bigger. With an ENEP of 7, 
the probability of switching decreases from 91% for a minimum level of satisfaction (0) to 9% 
only if a voter gives the maximum rating to her previous party (1). For small party systems 
(ENEP=3), by contrast, the probability of switching decreases from 72% to 9% as a voter moves 
from the lowest to the highest rating.  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results of the models with all control variables are presented in Appendix 5v and 
indicate that our findings are robust to controlling for some crucial individual-level predictors as 
well as other contextual-level factors.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Both switching parties and abstaining from voting can be considered close alternatives 
and their effects add up to volatility in election results. Despite the theoretical and empirical link, 
however, switching parties and abstaining have so far not been investigated simultaneously for a 
broad set of democracies. 
Doing so leads to a number of unexpected findings, elucidating important differences in the 
profiles of voters choosing these two options. Our multivariate analyses, in which we not only 
look at party switching versus stability but also at the contrast with abstaining from voting, 
provide important insights into Zelle’s frustrated floating voter hypothesis. Voters who switch 
parties are not dissatisfied with politics in general but party switchers clearly are dissatisfied with 
the party they previously voted for. This sense of dissatisfaction that is directed at a specific party 
does not, however, strongly affect the probability that a voter decides to abstain from voting. A 
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general sense of political dissatisfaction, on the other hand, does increase the probability that a 
voter abstains from voting, but party switchers are not more dissatisfied in general. In contrast to 
what Zelle (1995) observed, we do not come to the conclusion that volatile voters are ‘frustrated 
about politics’. Our results indicate that those who switch parties are not frustrated about politics; 
they are dissatisfied with a particular political party but still rely on the political system to voice 
their dissatisfaction. 
 Dissatisfaction with a party increases the probabilities of both party switching and 
abstaining, but a general sense of political dissatisfaction affects the probability that voters will 
abstain from voting only. Whether voters are dissatisfied with a specific party or with politics in 
general therefore affects what option they will use to voice dissatisfaction. While abstainers turn 
away from politics, voters switching parties make a more positive choice to express their 
dissatisfaction with the party previously voted for. Volatile voters are not randomly floating out 
of frustration; rather, they use their ballot to hold parties accountable for past performance. 
On the supply side, the number of parties is an important predictor of party switching; 
voters are more likely to switch parties from one election to another if there are more options to 
choose between. Additionally, a higher number of parties strengthens the link between 
dissatisfaction with one’s party and the probability to switch to another party. How voters voice 
dissatisfaction with their party therefore depends to a considerable degree on how many options 
they have. If the choice set is large, voters are more likely to switch to another party when they 
are not satisfied with the party they previously voted for. In short, the presence of many parties 
renders party switching a more viable option for voters who are dissatisfied with the party they 
previously preferred. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind one important limitation of our study. Because we 
believe it is important to look at patterns of voting behaviour that can be generalized across 
political systems, we have used a large international dataset (CSES). In doing so, we had to rely 
on recall questions about voters’ behaviour in the previous election. Ideally, of course, we would 
like to use panel data to avoid the pitfalls of recall questions. It would thus be useful to verify 
whether the patterns that have been uncovered here hold when panel data are utilized. 
Furthermore, investigating this question with panel data covering multiple waves could provide 
more insights in how satisfaction with a specific party can trigger a general sense of political 
17 
 
dissatisfaction and whether disappointed party switchers eventually decide to abstain from 
voting.  
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Table 1. Multinomial logit models explaining switching parties and switching to abstention  
  Switched 
parties versus 
loyal 
Abstained 
versus loyal 
Abstained 
versus switched 
parties 
Individual level     
Constant  1.911*** 
(0.163) 
-0.390 
(0.316) 
-2.292*** 
(0.363) 
Like-dislike of party 
previously voted for 
 -4.672*** 
(0.076) 
-3.359*** 
(0.117) 
1.302*** 
(0.123) 
Satisfaction with democracy  -0.065 
(0.049) 
-0.652*** 
(0.091) 
-0.584*** 
(0.094) 
Closeness to a party  -0.734*** 
(0.029) 
-0.866*** 
(0.053) 
-0.125* 
(0.057) 
Contextual level     
ENEP  0.200*** 
(0.028) 
0.234*** 
(0.059) 
0.009 
(0.066) 
Compulsory voting  -0.366 
(0.273) 
-2.302*** 
(0.707) 
-1.536*** 
(0.521) 
N observations  34,568 
N elections  36 
σ2 election-switching  0.293 σ2 election-abstaining  1.323 
Bayesian DIC  43,918.48 
Entries are unstandardized coefficients of a multinomial multilevel logit model, estimated via runmlwin in Stata. 
MCMC estimation. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variance components of the intercept-
only model: σ2 election-switching = 0.386;  σ2 election-abstaining = 1.822. 
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Table 2. Multinomial logit models explaining switching parties and switching to abstention – 
cross-level interaction 
 Switched 
parties 
versus loyal 
Abstained 
versus loyal 
Abstained 
versus 
switched 
parties 
Individual level    
Constant 0.656*** 
(0.149) 
-0.581 
(0.420) 
-2.024*** 
(0.476) 
Like-dislike of party previously 
voted for 
-2.810*** 
(0.283) 
-1.189*** 
(0.364) 
1.324*** 
(0.299) 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.058 
(0.051) 
-0.634*** 
(0.091) 
-0.557*** 
(0.094) 
Closeness to a party -0.705*** 
(0.029) 
-0.846*** 
(0.057) 
-0.134* 
(0.058) 
Contextual level    
ENEP 0.556*** 
(0.029) 
0.301*** 
(0.089) 
-0.132* 
(0.079) 
Compulsory voting -0.349 
(0.274) 
-2.648*** 
(0.546) 
-1.611** 
(0.711) 
Cross-level interactions    
Like-dislike of party previously 
voted for * ENEP 
-0.508*** 
(0.050) 
-0.575*** 
(0.067) 
0.043 
(0.058) 
N observations 34,568  
N elections 36  
σ2 constant election-switching 2.630  σ2 constant election-abstaining 2.578  σ2 like-dislike election-switching 3.341  
σ2 like-dislike election-abstaining 2.133  
Bayesian DIC 43,420.68  
Entries are unstandardized coefficients of a multinomial multilevel logit model, estimated via runmlwin in Stata. 
MCMC estimation. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Variance components of the intercept-
only model: σ2 election-switching = 0.386;  σ2 election-abstaining = 1.822. 
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Figure 1. Probability of loyalty, switching and abstaining by liking the party previously voted for  
 
Predicted probabilities and 95%-confidence intervals by like-dislike rating of previous party. Predictions with all 
covariates set at their sample means. Based on estimates of Model II in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Probability of switching for different party system sizes  
 
 
Predicted probabilities and 95%-confidence intervals by like-dislike rating of previous party. Predictions with all 
covariates set at their sample means. Based on estimates in Table 3. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                        
i
. Given that Belgium can be considered a country with two separate party systems, the Dutch- 
and French-speaking samples for Belgium were considered different election-samples. 
ii
. A full overview of reasons for excluding some elections is provided in Appendix 2. 
iii. Only election samples for which no single party’s vote share was over 7.5 points off the 
official results and for which this bias strongly diverged from the bias in the survey year (over 5 
points difference) were retained. Additional tests indicated that being stricter in which election 
samples to include for the analyses does not alter our conclusions. See Appendix 4 for detailed 
information on biases and Appendix 2 on which election samples were retained. 
iv
. An extensive description of the coding of party switching for all countries included can be 
found in Appendix 3.  
v
 . Note that the addition of more control variables reduces the estimation sample at both the 
individual and the contextual level, see Appendix 5. 
 
